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ARTICLES
THE SOCIAL SECURITY-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
OFFSET IN PRACTICE
ARTHUR LARSON*
The present social security offset provision for workmen's compen-
sation benefits states that the social security disability benefit for any
month shall be reduced to the point where the combined social security
and periodic workmen's compensation benefit does not exceed 80 per-
cent of the individual's average current earnings.'
*A.B, Augustana College, 1931; BA., Oxford, 1935; MA, Oxford, 1938; B.C.L,
Oxford, 1957; D.C., Oxford, 1957 Director, Rule of Law Research Center, Duke
Umversity School of Law.
1. The key passages of § 424 of the Social Security Act, ormtting a number of
detailed and specialized provisions, are as follows:
(a) If for any month prior to the month m which an individual attains
the age of 62-
(1) such individual is entitled to benefits under section 423, and
(2) such individual is entitled for such month, under a worknen's com-
pensation law or plan of the Umted States or a State, to periodic benefits
for a total or partial disability (whether or not permanent), and the
Secretary has, in a prior month, received notice of such entitlement for
such month,
the total of his benefits under section 423 for such month and of any bene-
fits under section 402 for such month based on his wages and self-employ-
ment income shall be reduced (but not below zero) by the amount by
which the sum of-
(3) such total of benefits under section 423 and 402 for such month, and
(4) such periodic benefits payable (and actually paid) for such month to
such individual under the worknen's compensation law or plan,
exceeds the higher of-
(5) 80 per centuin of his "average current earnings," or
(6) the total of such individual's disability insurance benefits under sec-
tion 423 for such month and of any monthly insurance benefits under
section 402 for such month based on his wages anc self-employment in-
come, prior to reduction under this section
[ 539 ]-
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When disability benefits were first added to the Social Security
Act in 1956, a rather crude offset provision was included. Generally,
this provision reduced benefits by the amount of compensation received
from other systems. In 1957, this was amended to make it inapplicable
to service-connected veteran's disability benefits, and in 1958 the entire
offset provision was quietly repealed. In 1965, an offset provision was
again enacted. While this provision was somewhat more carefully
drafted, an ambiguity in the definition of "average current earnings"
led to some confusion on whether the alternate five-year earnings test
was subject to the artificial maximum on covered earnings imposed for
purposes of figuring contributions and benefits. This confusion was
remedied by a 1967 amendment that made it explicit that no such
ceiling applied.
The principal purpose of this article is to examine how the offset
provision is being interpreted and applied in practice. Since the con-
stitutionality of the offset has only recently been upheld by the United
States Supreme Court,2 it might be appropriate to begin by indicating
very briefly the background of case law in the lower courts on this issue
and the principal lines of argument. All but one of the decisions on the
constitutional issue in federal district and circuit courts had held the
For purposes of Clause (5), an individual's average current earnings means
the larger of (A) the average monthly wage used for purposes of com-
puting his benefits under section 423, or (B) one-sixtieth of the total of
his wages and self-employment income (computed without regard to the
limitations specified in sections 409(a) and 411 (b) (1)) for the five consecu-
tive calendar years after 1950 for which such wages and self-employment
income were highest
(b) If any periodic benefit under a workmen's compensation law or plan
is payable on other than a monthly basis (excluding a benefit payable as
a lump sum except to the extent that it is a commutation of, or a substitute
for, periodic payments), the reduction under this section shall be made at
such time or times and in such amounts as the Secretary finds will ap-
proximate as nearly as practicable the reduction prescribed by subsection
(a)
(d) The reduction of benefits required by this section shall not be made
if the workmen's compensation law or plan under which a periodic benefit
is payable provides for the reduction thereof when anyone is entitled to
benefits under this subchapter on the basis of the wages and self-employ-
ment income of an individual entitled to benefits under section 423.
42 U.S.C. § 424(a) (1970).
2. Belcher v. Richardson, 404 US. 78 (1971).
,19.72] OFFSET 541
offset constitutional. 8 The basis of constitutionality was well ex-
pounded in the Sixth Circuit's opinion in Lofty v. Richardson.4 The
court began with the Supreme Court's formulation of the "invidious
classificaton" rule in Flemmmg v. Nestor:5
[W] e must recognize that the Due Process Clause can be thought
to interpose a bar only if the statute manifests a patently arbitrary
classification, utterly lacking in rational justification.6
The primary basis of attack in Lofty was that Congress did not
also create an offset for such benefits as private insurance proceeds and
recoveries in damage suits. The court reviewed the development of
Supreme Court cases establishing a very broad congressional discretion
in adopting classifications for legislative purposes. It then examined the
legislative history of the offset, stressing that the main purpose was
elimination of duplication of benefits that in many instances resulted
in total benefits exceeding actual previous wages while working. The
court set out in full a table "purporting to show that continued dupli-
canon of benefits under, terms of the then pending bill would mean
at least some payments in excess of prior average 'take home pay' in
every state, and up to a maximum of 247% in the instance of Ari-
zona." The adverse effect of this situation on incentives to become
rehabilitated and to return to work was noted.
As to the invidious classification argument, the court adduced three
answers: The first was that there had been widespread complaints
about double coverage as to compensation and social security, but no
such complaints as to the proceeds of private insurance or negligence
actions. The second was that administratively it would be relatively
simple to enforce the compensation offset, while to calculate and apply
3. Benjamn v. Richardson, Civil No. 20,714 (6th Cir., April 29, 1971), aff'g sub nom.
Benjamin v. Finch, Civil No. 32,816 (E.D. Mich., May 23, 1970); Lofty v. Richardson,
440 F.2d 1144 (6th Cir. 1971), aff'g sub nom. Lofty v. Cohen, 325 F Supp. 285 (E.D.
Mich. 1970); Rodatz v. Finch, Civil No. 69-170 (ED. Il., Sept. 4, 1970); Miley v.
Finch, Civil No. 33,560 (ED. Mich., June 12, 1970); Bailey v. Finch, 312 F Supp.
918 (N.D. Miss. 1970); Bartley v. Finch, 311 F Supp. 876 (ED. Ky. 1970); Gambill v.
Finch, 309 F Supp. 1 (E.D. Tenn. 1970). Contra, Belcher v. Richardson, 317 F Supp.
1294 (SD. W Va. 1970), reV'd, 404 U.S. 78 (1971).
4. 440 F.2d 1144 (6th Cir. 1971).
5. 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
6. Id. at 611.
7. Lofty v. Richardson, 440 F.2d 1144, 1148-49 (6th Cir. 1971).
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a reduction for private insurance and civil damages might offer severe
difficulties. The third reason was the most important:
Finally, it is entirely conceivable to us that Congress may have
considered Social Security benefits and Workmen's Compensation
benefits to be more arguably duplicative of one another than could
appropriately be claimed concerning Social Security benefits and
the other two types of payments. Both Social Security and Work-
men's Compensation are social welfare legislation.8 Private acci-
dent or disability insurance is a private contract, frequently paid
for entirely by the recipient. And, of course, court awards for
injuries are private rights derived from the common law involving
the principle of compensation for negligence or fault.
Most of the argument for the Workmen's Compensation offset
came from employers who generally pay all of the costs for
Workmen's Compensation and half of the costs of the Social
Security benefits. Their argument before Congress was that they
were paying twice for the same injury This argument would
have, of course, no merit at all in relation to a damage action award
or to the proceeds of privately purchased accident or disability
msurance.9
To WHAT AcTs AND PAYMENTS THE OFFSET APPLIES
The statute applies the offset to benefits "under a workmen's com-
pensation law or plan of the Umted States or a State." i0 The offset thus
8. It was on this point that the district court in Belcher v. Richardson, 317 F Supp.
1294 (SD. WVa. 1970), rev'd, 404 U.S. 78 (1971), parted company with the ma-
jority The court argued that workmen's compensation is not a public benefit, but
rather a matter of private contract "sanctioned by law." The court equated "public
benefit" with "a gift from the public largesse"-a term which might fit public assist-
ance, but which certainly does not fit any social insurance program, including social
security itself. Nor is workmen's compensation merely "sanctioned" by law. It is
compelled in many states directly, and in most others indirectly. The decision was
particularly curious because the court stressed West Virginia law, and in West Virginia
the method of financing is an exclusive state fund. But because the fund is sup-
ported entirely by employer contributions, the court argued that no public funds
were involved, forgetting that all public funds ultimately come from some category
of private taxpayers or contributors. In any event, even if the method of financing
were private insurance, this does not alter the essentially public purpose and character
of the system as a whole. See A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
§ 97.20 (1952) [hereinafter cited as LARSON].
9. Lofty v. Richardson, 440 F.2d 1144, 1151-52 (6th Cir. 1971).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 424(a)(2) (1969).
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clearly applies to the Longshoremen's Act," but it has been held by
administrative decision not to apply to recoveries under the Jones
Act. 2 It has also been administratively decided that payments under
the "Black Lung" act' 3 are periodic benefits under a federal work-
men's compensation law for purposes of the offset. 4
Since the design of the offset is to prevent actual duplication of in-
come benefits, it is obviously only fair and logical to exclude from
any compensation benefit such amounts as represent medical and legal
expenses, and the regulations of the Department of Health, Education
and Welfare explicitly so provide. 15 The problem that this sometimes
raises in connection with lump-sum awards or settlements is discussed
in the next section.
Is the offset provision any less applicable because the compensation
award was for a scheduled injury and was therefore not based on actual
wage loss? The United States District Court for the Southern District
of Mississippi has ruled that the scheduled nature of the injury does
11. See, e.g., Ladner v. Secretary of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 304 F. Supp. 474
(S.D. Miss. 1969).
12. Appeals Council Decision, S.S.R. 70-57a (Nov. 1970). Claimant was being paid
$42 a week by the employer's insurance carrier pending a Jones Act settlement.
13. 30 U.S.C. § 901 (1965). For a detailed discussion see LAiiSON, supra note 8, § 41.12
(note 47, supplement).
14. S.S.R. 70-39 (July 1970).
15. Amounts included m the workmen's compensation award which are specifi-
cally identifiable as being for medical, legal or related expenses paid or
incurred by the individual in connection with his workmen's compensation
claim, or the injury or occupational disease on which such award or agree-
ment is based, are excluded in computing the reduction under paragraph
(a) of this section.
20 C.F.R. § 404.408(d) (1971).
Note, however, that if because of state maximum lirmts on compensation medical
benefits the claimant had to pay some medical expenses out of his own pocket, these
private outlays cannot be deducted from the offset. Iglinsky v. Richardson, 433 F.2d
405 (5th Cir. 1970). Nor is this construction invalid for inequality of treatment of
claimants in different states, because the inequality is the result of state legislation,
not the federal act.
Note also that workmen's compensation hospital and medical benefits are deducted
from medicare payments. The Social Security Act § 1862(b) provides:
Payment under this title may not be made with respect to any item or
service to the extent that payment has been made, or can reasonably be
expected to be made (as determined in accordance with regulations), with
respect to such item or service, under a workmen's compensation law or
plan of the United States or a State. Any payment under this title with
respect to any item or service shall be conditioned on reimbursement to
the appropriate Trust Fund established by tls titde when notice or other
information is received that payment for such item or service has been
made under such a law or plan.
1972]
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not change the basic nature of the benefit as a periodic payment for
disability 16 Claimant had received an award for 52.5 percent loss of
use of his right leg, which entitled him to 151.2 weeks of compensation
under the Longshoremen's Act. He was paid 55.8 weeks of compensa-
tion on a weekly basis, and then received a lump-sum payment for
the remaining 95 4 weeks. Claimant contended that the offset should
not apply to scheduled injuries at all, on the theory that a distinction
should be drawn between a claim based on loss of a scheduled member,
which is not dependent on a showing of actual loss of earning capacity,
and a claim based on the same loss under the Social Security Act,
which requires a showing of actual inability to engage in substantial
gainful activity The court rejected this distinction on the ground that
the scheduled injury itself conclusively establishes loss of earning ca-
pacity for the period specified, and from that point on the incidents of
actual and schedule disability are the same. In this case, the result
was reinforced by the fact that the claimant had already been receiving
his benefits on a periodic basis, exactly as if they had been for a non-
scheduled injury
This holding is clearly in line with the generally accepted concept
in the United States that schedule awards are indeed awards for loss of
earning capacity, the only difference from other awards being that the
loss is conclusively presumed. However, there is a view in some quar-
ters that schedule awards are at least in part a compensation for physi-
cal loss as such.'1 It would not be surprising, then, to see an effort
made to resist the offset as to lump-sum awards for scheduled injuries
in the small minority of states where the physical impairment theory
has some vogue. When, as in the usual case, the schedule award is
expressed in a number of weeks, it would presumably be particularly
difficult to make the distinction between schedule and non-schedule
awards hold. One can, however, see interesting questions approaching
on the horizon when the award, as in some disfigurement statutes, is
expressed not in weeks but in dollars, often in the rather broad dis-
cretion of the admimstrator. Here again, the sounder theory is that
the award is based on presumed impairment of earning capacity,18 but
16. Ladner v. Secretary of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 304 F Supp. 474 (S.D. Miss.
1969). See also Knapczyk v. Ribicoff, 201 F Supp. 283 (N.D. Ill. 1962), in which
the offset compensation award was for 141 weeks for a shoulder and arm injury,
although no actual time was lost.
17. See LARsoN, supra note 8, 5 57.10.
18. Id. S 58.32.
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admittedly the form of the award rmght complicate the task of assert-
ing and applying the offset.
Although ordinarily the disabilities involved under the two systems
would flow from the same illness or injury, it has been held in at least
one case under the earlier version of the offset provision that compen-
sation benefits may be offset even when the social security benefit is
occasioned by an unrelated disability 19 The claimant had received a
lump-sum award for 141 weeks for an arm and shoulder injury, begin-
ning as of June, 1956. In November, 1956 she suffered an unrelated
heart attack. It was held that the benefits for the arm injury must be
offset against the social security disability benefits for the heart attack.
The court, in reaching this conclusion, relied mainly on an inference
drawn from the fact that the first offset provision had been amended
in 1957 to exclude service-connected veterans' benefits. Obviously,
reasoned the court, Congress could not have intended to lint the offset
to disabilities stemming from the same injury, since if this had been
the case it would have been unnecessary to exempt service-connected
injuries that presumably arose before the disabling event under social
security Congress could not be presumed to have enacted useless legis-
lation.
Under the current statute, which explicitly speaks of a "workmen's
compensation law or plan of the United States or a State" instead of
the more vague periodic federal benefits concept contained in the
earlier offset provision, there has been no need for the exemption of
veterans' service-connected disability benefits, and consequently this
rationale is not directly available. However, with this ruling on the
books, Congress, in the later offset provision, applied the offset to
periodic benefits for-not "such" or "the same" disability-but "a total
or partial disability" It is therefore difficult to see how a limitation
to the same disability could be read into the section, both in view of
its literal language and the scant legislative and judicial background.
APPLYING THE OFFSET TO LUMP SUMS
When a lump-sum payment is a commutation of or substitute for
periodic payments, the regular offset applies, 20 and the great majority
of reported decisions dealing with ordinary lump-sum payments have
19. Knapezyk v. Ribicoff, 201 F. Supp. 283 (N.D. Ill. 1962).
20. 42 US.C. S 424(b) (1969).
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found them to be subject to the offset for this reason.2' This conclu-
sion may be buttressed by state decisions holding that compensation
redemption agreements are normally, at least in part, a commutation
of weekly payments,2 2 as well as by reference to the language of the
lump-sum award, which sometimes expressly uses some such phrase as
"in lieu of weekly payments." 23 However, it is the real nature and
purpose of the payment, rather than the words used to describe it, that
ultimately controls.2 4 And, if what the claimant gives up in exchange
for the settlement is his right to periodic payments, it does not matter
that the calculation of the lump-sum amount itself cannot be shown to
have been arrived at by actuarial methods applied to the value of future
periodic payments; the offset must still be applied.
25
As noted earlier, so much of a compensation payment as is attri-
butable to medical or legal expenses is not to be offset.2 If it appears
that this adjustment has been made, the burden is on the claimant to
show that the lump sum included some additional medical expense not
accounted for in the adjustment.2 7 But if it is not clear that medical
expenses have been deducted from the award before the offset was ap-
21. See, e.g., Benjamin v Richardson, Civil No. 20,714 (6th Cir., April 24, 1971);
Rodatz v. Finch, Civil No. 69-170 (E.D. Ill., Sept. 4, 1970); Miley v. Finch, Civil No.
33,560 (E.D. Mich., June 12, 1970); Bailey v Finch, 312 F Supp. 918 (N.D. Miss.
1970); Nieves v. Secretary of Health, Educ. & Welfare, Civil No. 63-68 (D.P.R,
May 20, 1969); Ladner v. Secretary of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 304 F Supp. 474
(S.D. Miss. 1969).
22. Benjamin v Richardson, Civil No. 20,714 (6th Cir., April 29, 1971), citing
Wehmcier v. W E. Wood Co., 377 Mich. 176, 139 N.W.2d 733 (1966), for the propo-
sition that, under the Michigan law, a redemption settlement of this type always
constitutes in part a commutation of periodic payments. Accord, Rodatz v. Finch,
Civil No. 69-170 (E.D. Ill., Sept. 4, 1970), citing Knapczyk v. Ribicoff, 201 F Supp.
283 (N.D. Ill. 1962); Miley v. Finch, Civil No. 33,560 (E.D. Mich., June 12, 1970)
(applying Michigan law); Bailey v. Finch, 312 F Supp. 876 (N.D. Miss. 1970) (ap-
plying Mississippi law); Nieves v. Secretary of Health, Educ. & Welfare, Civil No.
63-68 (D.P.R., May 20, 1969) (citing the holding of the Supreme Court of Puerto
Rico); Walters v. Flemming, 185 F Supp. 288 (D. Mass. 1960) (applying Massachusetts
law); S.S.R. 71-15a (March 1971) (the Appeals Council, applying Missouri law,
found the lump-sum compromise settlement to be a substitute for periodic payments)
23. Benjamin v. Finch, Civil No. 32,816 (E.D. Mich., May 25, 1970).
24. Nieves v. Secretary of Health, Educ. & Welfare, Civil No. 63-68 (D.P.R., May 20,
1969). See also Rodatz v. Finch, Civil No. 69-170 (E.D. Ill., Sept. 4, 1970). The
settlement spoke of "all disputed claims .for future medical and attendant care,"
but the examiner found that the settlement was really a commutation of periodic
payments, and the court affirmed for the reasons stated by the examiner.
25. Walters v. Flemming, 185 F Supp. 288 (D. Mass. 1960).
26. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.408(d) (1971).
27. Benjamin v. Richardson, Civil No. 20-714 (6th Cir., April 24, 1971).
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plied, the case will be remanded for a specific calculation of how much
of the payment was for periodic benefits and how much for past and
future medical expenses.28
In Slone v. Finob,29 the court was confronted with a lump sum of
$8,000 made in settlement of the entire controversy The administrator,
after deducting $2,000 for attorneys' fees, divided the remainder by
approximately $40, the amount per week that the claimant had been
paid up to that time, and applied the offset to the number of weeks so
calculated. The court, however, rejected as unsupported by the record
the administrator's finding that the entire payment was intended as a
substitute for periodic payments. The claimant had in fact incurred
medical expense of about $2,600 during the first year after the injury
The court observed that in the Ohio statute there are two sections
dealing with lump sums, one which authorizes a straight commutation
of benefits to a lump sum30 and another which authorizes approval
of settlements, in connection with which the application must set
forth "the nature of the controversy "8 The latter, in the court's
opinion:
deals with setting at rest something that has never arnved at the
periodic payment stage-else why should one, in applying for a
'final settlement, be required to set forth "the nature of the con-
troversy" 82
The court then distinguished the simple commutation cases, and
added:
In this record there never occurred any event based on which
either the period involved in a periodic payment or the amount in-
volved in a periodic payment was determined. The only thing that
was determined in this case by the action of the Commission was
that $8,000.00 was a fair amount to pay, not in any commutation,
.but in exchange for a release of whatever claim it was this claimant
made. We point out that the claimant, as part of this settlement,
not only released any basic claim he had for periodic payment
but also released any claim which he ight ever have in the future
28. Slone v. Finch, Civil No. 6-70-N (ED. Va, Nov. 24, 1970); Miley v. Finch,
Civil -No. 33,560 (E.D. Mich, June 12, 1970).
29. Civil No. 6-70-N (E.D. Va., Nov. 24, 1970).
30. Omo Rv. CODE ANN. S 4123.64 (Page 1959).
31. OHio REv. CODa ANN. § 4123.65 (Page 1959).
32. Slone v. Finch, Civil No. 6-70-N (ED. Va., Nov. 24, 1970).
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for any medical or hospital expense-during the period of his disa-
bility prior to the settlement such payments amounted to about as
much as the periodic in-lieu-of-wages payments.83
The case was accordingly remanded for specific findings on how much
of the lump sum represented a substitute for future medical expense
and how much a substitute for periodic payments.
STATE COMPENSATION OFFSET FOR SOCIAL SECURITY AND OTHER
FEDERAL BENEFITS
Three states, Colorado, Montana, and Minnesota, apply some kind of
deduction to compensation benefits for social security benefits.
The Colorado provision states:
In cases where it is determined that periodic disability benefits
granted by the federal old-age, survivors, and disability insurance
act are payable to an individual, the weekly benefits payable pur-
suant to tis section shall be reduced, but not below zero, by an
amount equal as nearly as practical to one-half such federal peri-
odic benefits for such week; provided, that if provisions of the
federal old-age, survivors and disability insurance act should be
amended to provide for a reduction of an individual's disability
benefits thereunder because of compensation benefits payable
under this chapter, then the reduction of compensation benefits
provided herein shall be decreased by an amount equal to such
federal reduction.34
The Montana provision 5 is identical to Colorado's with two excep-
tions: in place of the words "to an individual," it contains the words,
"on account of such injury;" and it omits completely the proviso in
the second half of the sentence following the semicolon.
The Minnesota offset is n some ways more limited, and in other
ways less. In the subdivision on permanent total disability, there ap-
pears this passage:
This compensation shall be paid during the permanent total disa-
bility of the injured employee but after a total of $25,000 of
weekly compensation has been paid, the amount of the weekly
33. Id.
34. COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 81-12-1(4) (1963).
35. Montana Senate Bill 115, Ch. 174, enacted March 3, 1971, effective July 1, 1971.
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compensation benefits being paid by the employer shall be reduced
by the amount of any disability benefits being paid by any gov-
ernment disability benefit program if such disability benefits are
occasioned by the same injury or injuries which give rise to pay-
ments under tlus subdivision. Such reduction shall also apply to
any old age and survivor insurance benefits.36
Several observations may be made about these statutes on the strength
of the statutory language itself. As to the identity of the social
security benefits for which an offset is applied, it may be noted that
Montana has carefully limited the offset to benefits for the same injury,
Perhaps this was done to avoid the contrary result under the social
security offset in Knapczyk v. Riblcoff,37 a result which remains pos-
sible under the Colorado wording. The Minnesota statute, however, is
not even limited to social security disability benefits, since it expressly
applies to old age and survivors' benefits. Indeed, for a time Minne-
sota's reduction applied only to old age and survivors' benefits and not
to social security disability benefits.38 This was changed when the
act was amended in 1967 to cover any government disability benefits.
Note that like Montana, Minnesota has confined the disability benefit
offset to benefits occasioned by the same injury
It is interesting to note that the Colorado-Montana reduction applies
only to one-half of the federal benefit. This has obviously been done in
response to the familiar argument, repeatedly heard in debates on the
Social Security Act offset provision, that, since the employee has con-
tributed half of the "premium" for his social security coverage, it is
unfair to deduct anything from an insurance benefit paid for by his
own contribution.
One tantalizing problem that arises from a comparison of the literal
wording of the Colorado and federal statutes is that of the simultaneous
36. MiNn. STAT. ANi. § 176.101(4) (Supp. 1971).
37. 201 F Supp. 283 (ND. IIl. 1962).
38. Telle v. Northfield Iron Co., 278 Minn. 129, 153 N.W.2d 270 (1967). After
receiving the statutory maximum in benefits, claimant was entitled to further benefits
if they were credited with amounts he was eligible to receive under Old Age and
Survivors Insurance. At the time he was receiving disability benefits under the federal
Social Securty Act. At age 62, he could have received old-age benefits by giving
up the disability benefits, but since the latter were lugher, he did not do so. At age
65, the disability benefits were automatically changed into old-age benefits. The court
held that federal disability benefits were not to be credited against state benefits,
but the lesser amount of old-age benefits claimant could have received at 62 should
be so credited, and the benefits received at age 65 were all to be credited.
1972)
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mutual offset. The federal statute says that its offset shall not apply to
a state compensation law that offsets social security benefits, and while
the Colorado statute does indeed offset social security benefits, it does
so with the proviso that this offset shall be decreased by the amount
that the federal benefits are reduced to offset state compensation bene-
fits. This is the kind of rotating relationship that can induce a distinct
sense of giddiness if contemplated too long. It is of little help to suggest
that the locus of the offset should be fixed by reference to the point at
whch the claimant actually first seeks his benefits, because Colorado
has held in Hurtado v. C.F.&I. Stee 39 that its offset applies when the
claimant is entitled to the federal benefit, whether or not he has
actually applied for or received it. But how much is the social security
benefit to which Hurtado was entitled-the full benefit, or the benefit
reduced by offsetting the Colorado compensation benefit? The federal
act says that the social security benefit shall not be reduced if the state
act provides for the reduction of state benefits to account for federal
payments, which the Colorado act does. Or does it? In view of the
proviso stipulating that the state reduction shall itself be reduced by
the federal reduction, is there any state reduction left on which to
base the exception to the federal reduction? It is the sort of thing one
would prefer not to have to think about.4"
The Colorado provision, having been enacted before the current
federal offset provision was adopted, could not anticipate the exact
form the federal offset would take-including the exception for state
offsets that has produced the circular situation just described. It is
sigmficant that Montana, with the advantage of having the federal
statute before it at the time of drafting its version, omitted the Colo-
rado proviso. Complications can still be foreseen, due among other
things to the differing formulas controlling the amount of offset-the
39. Hurtado v. C.F.&I. Steel Corp., 168 Colo. 37, 449 P.2d 819 (1969). Colorado
provides for a reduction in weekly benefits when a claimant is also entitled to receive
periodic disability benefits from federal social security Claimant was entitled to such
benefits, but did not claim nor receive them. Employer held entitled to reduce weekly
benefits, notwithstanding claimant's failure to receive social security benefits, since
he had a duty to obtain them if possible. The court further held that m the event
the employee disagreed with the amount of reduction, the industrial commission had
jurisdiction to determine if federal social security benefits were payable, and if so
the amount.
40. Informal inquiries leave the impression that the administrators so far are living
with this tangle by adopting a sort of Alphonse-and-Gaston give-and-take handling
of these cases as they arise.
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state limitation to half of the federal benefit and the federal limitation
of the combined benefits to 80 percent of "average current earnings."
Colorado has softened the impact of the offset significantly in the
case of occupational diseases. Although Colorado generally pays total
permanent disability benefits for life, it has a fixed maximum aggregate
amount payable for occupational diseases. 41 A claimant was awarded
benefits for permanent total disability due to silicosis, but since he was
also receiving federal social security benefits, the weekly amount was
reduced by the industrial commission, along with the maximum ag-
gregate amount. The court, however, held that since the statute only
referred to weekly benefits, it was error to reduce the aggregate
amount claimant was entitled to receive in compensation benefits.42
Thus, if the claimant survived long enough to consume the maximum
aggregate compensation amount he would ultimately have received the
same number of dollars as if there had been no offset, although in
smaller weekly installments.
Apart from specific offset provisions,43 the receipt of federal benefits
41. As of 1970, this total maximum was $18,623.50.
42. Indus. Comm'n v. Rowe, 162 Colo. 248, 425 P.2d 274 (1967).
43. As to offsetting National Guard benefits, see the following cases:
Contois v. State, 95 R.I. 296, 186 A.2d 741 (1962). A member of the National
Guard died as a result of a compensable heart attack. The Rhode Island statute [RI.
GEN. LAws ANN. 5 28-31-11 (1956)] provides that state workmen's compensation
benefits shall be payable to a member of the national or state guard, but reduced by
the amount received "from the Umted States." The court held that full state com-
pensation death benefits were payable to the dependent widow without reduction for
amounts paid by the Veterans' Adrmnistration, since § 28-31-11 was silent as to death
benefits.
Coletta v. State, - R.I. -, 263 A.2d 681 (1970). The Rhode Island statute provides
that when payments received from the Umted States by an injured member of the
National Guard are less than the workmen's compensation to which he is entitled,
the payments from the Umted States shall be deducted from the compensation payable.
In the present instance, the payments received from the Umted States were more.
The court held that the obvious purpose was to establish an offset, and that to fail
to apply it when the amount of federal payments was more than the compensation
would lead to an absurd and unreasonable result, in contravention of the clear mten-
tion of the legislature. The court also held, however, that a schedule award for an
eye should not be subjected to the offset, since here the statute was ambiguous, and
the claimant should have the benefit of the doubt under the liberal construction prm-
ciple.
As to coordination with veterans' medical benefits, see, Theriot v. Schlumberger
Well Surveying Corp., - La. App. -, 131 So.2d 94 (1961). The Veterans' Ad-
nmstration provided free medical care upon the claimant's statement that he was
unable to pay the costs. Thereafter the claimant could not clain medical benefits for
the V.A. hospital expenses. The V.A. could not be awarded payments directly, nor
could the V.A. subsequently charge the claimant for the free service.
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does not ordinarily affect a worker's right to workmen's compensation
benefits," although it may be relevant to the issue of dependency when
a relative is required to establish actual dependency 41
CONCLUSION
Although the Social Security Act's offset provision is still the object
of intense criticism, it seems probable that this time the offset is here
to stay The 80 percent ceiling on combined benefits is itself the target
of a great deal of pressure, and some upward revision of that ceiling,
even to 100 percent, is not to be ruled out. Difficult questions both of
amendment and interpretation still lie ahead, but the difficulties should
not be insuperable if the central purpose of the offset idea is kept
firmly in view- to provide the beneficiary with the fullest possible
protection to which he is entitled under a coordinated social insurance
system, while always respecting the cardinal social insurance principle
that the benefits for disability must never be more attractive than the
corresponding earnings for active employment.
44. Cudahy Packing Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 7 Ariz. App. 335, 439 P.2d 307 (1968).
After becoming totally disabled, claimant was entitled to social security disability
benefits. Held, these benefits were not to be considered in determining loss of wage-
earning capacity.
Meyers v. Walsh Constr. Co., 12 App. Div. 2d 371, 211 N.Y.S.2d 590 (1961). A
seventy-year-old claimant had quit work and elected to receive Social Security bene-
fits. The court stated that his actions did not control his right to compensation, nor
would it justify a finding that the claimant had removed himself from the labor
market.
Aguillina v. Victor Adding Mach. Co., 26 App. Div. 2d 869, 273 N.Y.S.2d 988 (1966).
Prior to claimant's hearing, but after his injury, he had been found totally disabled
by reason of an unrelated stomach ailment, by the Veterans' Admirnstranon and the
Social Security Admiistration. Finding that present disability was due to the com-
pensable accident and award of benefits affirmed.
Snead v. Adams Constr. Co., 72 N.M. 94, 380 P.2d 836 (1963). Compensation award
for 100 percent disability granted in addition to a previous award for 60 percent
disability granted by the Veterans' Administration for a service-connected disability
Cf. the special subsequent-injury provision involved in Subsequent Injuries Fund v.
Indus. Acc. Comm'n, 217 Cal. App. 2d 322, 28 Cal. Comp. 144, 31 Cal. Rptr. 508 (1963).
The claimant was adjudged totally disabled-31.75 percent due to the industrial acci-
dent and the remaining 68.25 percent due to preexisting conditions. The Subsequent
Injuries Fund claimed credit for "monetary payments received by the employee from
any source whatsoever for or on account of said preexisting disability" [CAL. LABoR
CoDE S 4753 (1955)]. The amount the claimant received under Social Security Dis-
ability Insurance Benefits (42 U.S.C.), being paid for his entire disability were credited
to the extent of 68.25 percent, as representing the portion of benefits applicable to the
preexisting condition.
45. See, e.g., Peterson v. Thief River Falls Welding Co., 245 Minn. 212, 72 N.W.2d
75 (1955). Held, that Social Security payments should be taken into account n
determining dependency of parents.
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